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Abstract—Recent natural disasters have revealed that emer-
gency networks presently cannot disseminate the necessary dis-
aster information, making it difficult to deploy and coordinate
relief operations. These disasters have reinforced the knowledge
that telecommunication networks constitute a critical infrastruc-
ture of our society, and the urgency in establishing protection
mechanisms against disaster-based disruptions.
Hence, it is important to have emergency networks able to
maintain sustainable communication in disaster areas. Moreover,
the network architecture should be designed so that network
connectivity is maintained among nodes outside of the impacted
area, while ensuring that services for costumers not in the affected
area suffer minimal impact.
As a first step towards achieving disaster resilience, the RE-
CODIS project was formed, and its Working Group 1 members
conducted a comprehensive literature survey on “strategies for
communication networks to protect against large-scale natural
disasters,” which is summarized in this article.
Index Terms—vulnerability, end-to-end resilience, natural dis-
asters, disaster-based disruptions.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the findings of a taxonomy of Internet failures [1]
was that existing protection mechanisms may be adequate
for single link or node failures, but they cannot deal with
large-scale disasters. Recent natural disasters exposed the
vulnerability of communication networks to those events.
Following meteorological observations, the risk of natural
disasters is rising. Disaster-based failures are commonly im-
plied by such natural factors as: hurricanes, tsunamis, floods,
or earthquakes. Tens of hurricanes worldwide are observed
every year leading to power outages affecting communication
networks on a massive scale and for a relatively long time
(10 days on average). Examples include e.g., hurricane Katrina
which caused severe losses in Louisiana and Mississippi in
Southeastern US in August 2005. The 7.1-magnitude earth-
quake in December 2006 in Southern Taiwan was responsi-
ble for disruption of international communications to China,
Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan due to simultaneous
failures of seven submarine links providing Internet connec-
tivity between Asia and North America. The Greatest Japan
Earthquake on March 11, 2011 (of 9.0-magnitude), in turn
completely (or partially) destroyed the telecom switching
offices and was responsible for a massive damage to undersea
cables.
Emergency networks have failed to disseminate the neces-
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sary disaster information, making it difficult to deploy and
coordinate relief operations. This has reinforced our knowl-
edge that telecommunication networks are critical to society,
and that disaster-based disruptions must be addressed. Hence,
there is a strong need to implement mechanisms ensuring end-
to-end communications between operational network nodes,
even if only at a degraded level (low rate and/or large delays)
in disaster-stricken areas. The goal is to be able to secure the
necessary communications to support first-responder activities
in a damaged area, and to have a strategy to progressively
restore network services in the aftermath of the initial shock.
Although the existence of an emergency network in a
disaster area is important, it is also desirable that network
connectivity is maintained among nodes outside the impacted
area. Networks can be designed so that services for costumers
not in the affected areas suffer minimal impact. This can
be achieved using proactive and reactive approaches [2], [3].
For example, geographically-diverse routing [4] will increase
network resilience to geographically-correlated failures.
A systematic approach on how to build resilient network
systems can be found in [5], an overview of algorithms for
survivable planning and routing is given in [6], and a survey
on disaster survivability in optical networks is presented in [2].
More recently, Miranda et al. [7] presented a brief overview
of the requirements for rapidly re-establishing connectivity
and for providing levels of service adequate for emergency
services. The COST CA15127 (RECODIS) Action is aimed to
develop appropriate solutions to provide cost-efficient resilient
communications in the presence of disaster-based disruptions,
considering both existing and emerging communication net-
work architectures. As a first step towards achieving the goals
of RECODIS, and within the context of the activities its
Working Group 1 (Large-scale natural disasters), a survey
of existing strategies for communication networks to protect
against large-scale natural disasters is presented here.
The paper is structured as follows: In section II, an overview
of the vulnerability of communication networks to disaster-
based disruptions is presented. In section III, rules and tech-
niques for making network architectures less vulnerable to
disaster-based failures are analysed. In section IV, disaster-
resilient routing algorithms are discussed. Section V concludes
the paper.
II. VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNICATION NETWORKS TO
DISASTER-BASED DISRUPTIONS
The efficient protection of communication networks against
large-scale disasters requires, as a first step, the assessment of
the vulnerability of communication networks and its support-
ing physical infrastructures to such events. In this section, we
review the recent scientific literature on measures, methods,
and systematic approaches dealing with network vulnerability
assessment and with the identification of the most vulnerable
regions of networks. We also review the current threats and
trends concerning the vulnerability of the physical infrastruc-
tures supporting communication networks.
A. Measures of network vulnerability
Critical Node Detection (CND) is a valuable method to
determine the vulnerability of networks to multiple failures.
CND problems aim to optimally remove a subset of nodes
(the critical nodes) of a given network in order to optimize or
restrict a given metric of network degradation. The problem
can be defined either by upper-bounding the number of critical
nodes and maximizing the degradation metric, or by lower-
bounding the degradation metric and minimizing the number
of critical nodes. Veremyev et al. [8] address two CND variants
defined on a simple undirected graph G. In the first variant,
for a given integer K, the aim is to identify a set of K critical
nodes minimizing the pairwise connectivity (also referred to
as the average 2-terminal reliability metric in other works). In
the second variant, for a given integer L, the aim is to identify
a minimum set of critical nodes, so that the largest connected
component in the remaining graph contains no more than L
nodes. For both variants, the authors propose alternative more
compact Integer Linear Programming (ILP) models, together
with reformulations and valid inequalities that improve the
performance of solvers, while computing the optimal solutions
of given problem instances.
For a given graph with associated node costs and a given
cost budget C, Veremyev et al. [9] consider a set of critical
nodes as a subset of all nodes whose total cost is not
higher than C and whose removal maximally degrades the
connectivity of the graph. In [9], the degradation aim is the
maximization of a distance-based connectivity metric, which
takes into account not only the pairwise connectivity but also
the shortest path distance penalties between node pairs that
remain connected. The paper proposes a general ILP model
(that can be adapted to the different distance-based metrics by
proper parameter definition) and an alternative exact algorithm
that iteratively solves a series of simpler ILP models. The
paper also compares the proposed approach with different
node centrality-based greedy algorithms (the degree centrality,
the closeness centrality, the betweenness centrality and the
eigenvector centrality) showing that it provides much better
solutions than the centrality-based ones.
For a given network, the objective of Dinh et al. [10] is to
compute a minimum set of critical network elements whose
removal results in a specific degradation target of the network
pairwise connectivity. The minimized set of network elements
is referred to as a β−disruptor, where 0 ≤ β < 1 denotes
the fraction target of the pairwise connectivity degradation.
Network elements can be either edges or nodes (vertices),
resulting in two problem variants (the β−edge disruptor and
the β−vertex disruptor). The paper proves that both prob-
lem variants are NP-hard and proposes an O(log n log logn)
pseudo-approximation algorithm (for the β−vertex disruptor)
and an O((log n)3/2) pseudo-approximation algorithm (for
the β−edge disruptor). For the β−vertex disruptor case, the
proposed method is compared with three node centrality-based
greedy algorithms: (i) sequentially removing the node with
maximum degree, (ii) sequentially removing the node with the
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maximum betweenness centrality, and (iii) sequentially remov-
ing nodes in descending order of their eigenvector centrality
values. The results show that the β−vertex disruptor sizes
of the node centrality-based algorithms are much larger than
the ones computed by the proposed pseudo-approximation
algorithm. In [11], Dinh et al. assume a given set of link costs
and another set of node costs and they extend the previous
work [10] to the general case where the β−disruptor can
be a mix of links and nodes. The paper proposes, first, a
O((log n)1/2) bicriteria approximation algorithm and, then, a
hybrid meta-heuristic that combines simulated annealing, vari-
able neighbourhood search and spectral clustering to improve
the efficiency of the bicriteria approximation algorithm.
Sterbenz et al. [5] propose ResiliNets, a framework intended
to unify several disciplines, strategies and principles used for
network survivability and resilience. The framework describes
axioms for systematic resilience and includes a so-called
D2R2+DR strategy with an inner control loop (D2R2 - defend,
detect, remediate, recover) aiming for a system to rapidly
adapt to challenges and attacks maintaining an acceptable
service level, and an outer control loop (DR - diagnose, refine)
enabling the longer-term evolution of the system. A set of
design principles for resilient systems is proposed, includ-
ing prerequisites, design trade-offs, enablers and behaviour
required for resilience. For resilience analysis, [5] proposes
a two-dimensional representation of the network state in the
operational state and service parameters dimensions, describ-
ing the effects of challenge→fault→error→failure chains as
state transitions in this space. In [12], the authors expand
the previous analysis, presenting path diversity metrics and an
(updated) analytical resilience framework, based on functional
metrics to quantify network resilience in the presence of
challenges, like (unspecified) disaster-based failures. A defi-
nition of the resilience space is provided, describing the states
through which the system may evolve while recovering from a
challenge. To evaluate vulnerability, the authors define a path
diversity function, which measures (graph) similarities on both
links and nodes, and a path diversity measure, defined as an ag-
gregation of path diversities for a selected set of paths between
a given node pair. The authors mention the need to include
geographic diversity through a function of desired minimum
distances between node pairs as a measure parameter to model
area-based challenges. The system resilience is computed as
the resilience space dimension (both in instantaneous/static
and average/dynamic).
Palmieri et al. [13] aim to study the stability and survivabil-
ity of the Internet on the occurrence of a catastrophic event.
Stability is defined at the routing level as a measure of the
number and frequency of topological information exchanges
within the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), while survivability
refers to the ability to quickly recover the service levels offered
before the catastrophic event. Three large-scale events were
analysed: the Taiwan Earthquake on December 27, 2006, the
Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, and the USA Blackout
on September 8, 2011. For each event, the authors used
BGP data collected by the Routing Information Service (RIS)
project from RIPE NCC to study the number of routes and
geo-localization of IP addresses that became unreachable. The
conclusion is that disasters cause catastrophic consequences
to the current Internet settings and architecture, in terms of
reachability of network prefixes, Internet global connectivity,
and recovery time. Moreover, the consequences are not limited
to the disaster area, but they also affect farther areas due to
the interdependencies between Autonomous Systems and the
damages of major transmission links between countries.
B. Identification of vulnerable regions
A large-scale disaster typically affects an area which can be
represented by a certain shape. Therefore, a problem of interest
is the identification of those areas in which the network is
embedded that, upon failure, would cause gravest disruption
to network performance.
Neumayer et al. [14] focus on assessing the level of vulner-
ability of geographical networks to natural disasters or human
attacks. The physical topology is modelled as a bipartite graph
in which nodes and links are geographically located on a
plane. The model has distinct height and width parameters,
representing the north-south and east-west geographic capacity
of the network. Then, a disaster results in a vertical line
segment cut in the bipartite graph which removes all links
that intersect it. A worst-case cut is defined as a cut with
the maximum total capacity of intersected links, and a Mixed
Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model is formulated for
identifying the worst-case cut that minimises the maximum
flow between its two sides. The authors also formulate a lower
bound on the worst-case cut and develop a polynomial time
algorithm for finding the worst-case cut in a bipartite graph.
In [15], Neumayer et al. study how to find the most vulner-
able parts of a network, subject to geographically correlated
failures. The network model considers nodes located in a
plane and connected via straight lines representing optical
fibres. Two geographical failure models are considered: (1)
line segments of a given length which may cut links, and (2)
circles of a given radius, which destroy all nodes and links
contained within, including links whose endpoints lie outside
the circle. Despite the infinite number of positions where the
line segments and circles can be placed, Neumayer et al. [15]
demonstrate that only a polynomial number of positions needs
to be considered. However, the proposed algorithms are of
high complexity, namely O(N6) or even O(N8), where N
represents the number of nodes. By using a slightly relaxed
failure model in which only links that have at least one end-
point in the failure region are destroyed, Trajanovski et al. [16]
are able to determine the most vulnerable region for a failure
of circular shape at a reduced complexity than that of [15].
Moreover, they can exactly and in polynomial time determine
such vulnerable regions also for failures of elliptical shape and
for shapes represented by a polygon.
Motivated by scenarios where nodes closer to the attack (or
disaster) central point have higher failure probabilities than
nodes farther away, Agarwal et al. [17] consider probabilis-
tic geographically-correlated failure models. The components
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(nodes, links, or lightpaths) have a failure probability function
and the focus is on finding the network parts that are expected
to be most vulnerable. In particular, three metrics are used: (1)
the expected component damage, (2) the average two-terminal
reliability, and (3) the expected maximum flow after the attack.
In addition, single as well as multiple simultaneous attacks are
considered. Agarwal et al. propose approximation algorithms
that are based on finding those intersections (called faces) of
the component failure probabilities that have the highest value.
Iqbal et al. [18] study the resilience of a network, where
geographical information is available for both nodes and links.
They focus on, and provide polynomial-time algorithms for,
finding the links that are spatially close to each other. The
definition of closeness is an input parameter and hence, if
very large, can represent a disaster scenario or, if small, can
represent a construction-related failure scenario. The proposed
algorithms make use of the R-Tree data structure used in
Geographical Information Science. Iqbal and Kuipers [19], in
addition to taking geographical information of nodes and links
into account, also include the notion of time and a risk profile
of the area in which the network is embedded. The rational is
that some disasters, like hurricanes, may traverse an area and
hence may lead to different component failure probabilities
at different points in time. They provide polynomial-time
algorithms to assess the most vulnerable connections.
Gardner and Beard [20] define a geographic vulnerability as
a geographic region, such that if the nodes (and links incident
on those nodes) in that region fail, the network becomes
disconnected. Using the Two-Terminal and All-Terminal meth-
ods, and depending on the radius of a threat, geographic
vulnerabilities are identified. These methods identify node cut
sets that fall within the threat radius. The consideration of the
threat radius allows the reduction of the search space, but the
computation time still grows exponentially.
Long et al. [21] propose the use of weighted spectrum
(WS) to evaluate network survivability regarding geographic
correlated failures. Furthermore, a comparative analysis is
conducted by solving an optimization problem to determine
the cut with the largest impact for a number of measures
in the literature (namely, Algebraic Connectivity, Network
Criticality, Average Shortest Path, Network Diameter) as well
as WS. The experiments show that WS is the most versatile
measure to evaluate geographically correlated vulnerable links
and nodes of backbone networks.
Critical services tend to be supported by virtual networks,
which increases the importance of considering the robust-
ness of multi-layered networks. Gardner et al. [22] define a
geospatial event as an occurrence that can cause a geographic
vulnerability, which in turn is defined as a geographic area of
a network that, if damaged, can cause significant impact to
the function of the entire network. The threat radius is used,
as in [20], to define a geographic vulnerability and a state-
space analysis method is proposed suitable for multi-layer
networks [22]. A network state is defined by the set of failed
and operational nodes. If a network state causes the network to
function below a given performance measure threshold, then
that state is said to cause the network to be non-functional.
In order to avoid the space state explosion, the multi-layered
Self-Pruning Network State Generation (SP-NSG) model [22],
for a given threat radius, selects for analysis only admissible
network states. Furthermore, and to make large networks
tractable, a K-means clustering algorithm is employed. This
work was extended in [23] where a new metric designated
Network Impact Resiliency (NIR) (inspired in performability)
is proposed. Network impact is an indication of the inability
of the network to perform its function in the network state
resulting from a failure and NIR combines network impact
with state probability.
C. Vulnerability of physical infrastructures: threats and trends
Over the last few decades, the demand for communication
structures has increased due to the requirements for their
use in the telecommunications sector and, with the advent
of mobile communications, this demand became even greater.
The telecommunications sector is becoming increasingly im-
portant in our modern society. Communication within social,
economic and industrial systems is becoming increasingly
digital, wireless and interdependent (e.g. with the power grid),
the consumer market is globally expanding, and there is an
escalating offer/demand input. The increased significance of
these systems comes at the same time when the life-span of
existing key physical infrastructures is reaching its maturity,
the market has changed from being state managed to being
fragmented, privatised and/or publicly regulated, and there is
not enough information available and adequate communication
within and between infrastructures sectors concerning vulner-
abilities. Unfortunately, the number of failures observed in
communication structures is high compared to other structures
of equal economic and societal importance [24], [25]. A great
number of failures observed are due to poor design, which
results in unsafe structures that can suffer from full collapse
[24], [25]. Mainly for economic and functional reasons, com-
munication structures, e.g. masts and towers, are lightweight
structures with structural characteristics such as high slender-
ness and high flexibility. With the desire to install wireless
hubs specifically in locations of high population density, new
structural forms have appeared, i.e. monopoles that challenge
the limits of conventional pole design. Though monopoles are
widely used, the current methods for their analysis and design
are outdated and/or inappropriate. Therefore, a detailed review
of both the methods of analysis and loads definition becomes
imperative [24], [26]. In the last decade, there has been a
growing interest in the field of structural health monitoring,
resulting in the development of new techniques and equipment,
such as fibre-optic sensors based on Fibre Bragg Gratings
(FBG). As underlined in recent studies, FBG-based accelerom-
eters are presented as an excellent tool to better understand the
response of this type of structures [24], [27]. As an example of
the failures observed in communication structures, the collapse
of a 40-metre-high monopole with a tubular cross-section is
shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1. Collapse of a 40-metre-high monopole Fig. 2. Detail of the rup-
ture at mid-height
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the United
States Gulf Coast and caused catastrophic damage to the
combined telecommunications and power infrastructure. Dev-
astating effects on both infrastructures hampered rescue ef-
forts, blocked attempts to coordinate early responses, and
made calls for aid impossible from the hardest-hit areas [28],
[29]. White House Katrina Report described the results: “The
complete devastation of the communications infrastructure left
responders without a reliable network to use for coordinating
emergency response operations” [28]. While it is tempting to
view a catastrophe such as Katrina as an once-in-a-lifetime
event, doing so would be an exercise in wishful thinking. Eight
months before Hurricane Katrina, on December 26, 2004,
the Indian Ocean tsunami highlighted the heavy human cost
of communications breakdown during extreme events. While
seismic monitoring stations throughout the world detected
the massive sub-sea earthquake that triggered the tsunami,
a lack of procedures for communicating these warnings to
governments and inadequate infrastructure in the regions at
risk delayed the transmission of warnings. However, based on
the successful evacuation of the handful of communities that
did receive adequate warning through unofficial channels, it is
clear that better communications could have saved thousands
of lives.
Climate change, natural catastrophes and failure of critical
infrastructures are ranked at the top of the 2015 Global Risks
database prepared by the World Economic Forum [30] and for
which less progress has been made. The latest UK National
Risk Register of Civil Emergencies also considers failure of
critical infrastructures to have a high risk level and thus a
priority risk [31]. Irrespective of the success of our mitigation
efforts, the impact of climate change will increase in the com-
ing decades. While efforts must continue towards mitigating
Fig. 3. Pre-disaster network robustness improvement
its effects, there is no other choice but to take adaptation
measures to deal with the unavoidable climate impacts that
are anticipated and their economic, environmental, and social
costs. Extreme weather and climate changes leave worldwide
infrastructure systems exposed to different and more extreme
conditions. Since the available amount of resources is finite,
it is highly likely that degradation and interruption of vital
services will occur at certain times. It is essential that stake-
holders can turn the page on inefficient past practices and com-
mit themselves to comprehensive and continuous planning and
management policies of critical infrastructure assets, with the
goal of reducing uncertainties, risks, and magnitude of adverse
consequences, increasing sector and society safety, resilience
and sustainability. Doing so requires a mix of technical and
policy changes that, together, will serve to mitigate damage
and accelerate restoration.
III. ENHANCING THE DISASTER-RESISTANCE OF
EXISTING NETWORKS AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF
EMERGENCY NETWORKS
Currently, several networking infrastructures are already
deployed and functioning around the world as part of the
global Internet. In order to have survivable networks, it is
infeasible to dismantle these existing networks and realize
novel ones that are properly equipped with means to support
suitable service and connectivity levels after the occurrence
of a disaster. The more realistic approach is to augment these
existing networks with proper means to increase their degree
of survivability. To this aim, there are two complementary
ways to proceed: network robustness improvements introduced
before the disaster occurrence, and recovery actions after the
disaster takes place. The following sub-sections describe the
available literature for these two directions.
A. Pre-disaster network robustness improvement
Current networks are characterised by intrinsic vulnera-
bilities within their design and deployment that affect their
survivability in case of a disaster. A first way to make existing
networks robust is to have network operators proactively adopt
proper means to minimize network disruptions and data loss
in the case of a disaster and to introduce a appropriate
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redundancy within the network. Figure 3 classifies proactive
techniques for network robustness and survivability.
Two of the main issues affecting the robustness of a network
in case of a disaster are connectivity availability and traffic
overload. Specifically, a disaster may be able to compromise
some network elements, such as routers, gateways or links,
reducing the connectivity within the network. This may cause
network partitions and a reduction of the possible paths among
the network nodes. The effect of this issue is that certain nodes
are no longer able to connect with the other ones and/or to
access the Internet, and/or traffic has to be forwarded only
along certain few links, causing congestion. Such phenomena
are further exacerbated by humans intensifying their activity
on the Internet after a disaster, by trying to obtain information
about the effects of the disaster or to contact their dearest ones.
For example, cellular networks are typically overloaded and
unable to provide any service after a natural and/or human-
made disaster within the affected area.
The natural solution to deal with the connectivity issue is to
provide redundancy within the network, i.e., networks should
be designed in such a way that any node of the network can
reach all other nodes of the network after a failure event. This
is typically obtained by improving fault tolerance via proactive
failure recognition and having several backup links when the
primary one is unavailable due to the disaster, as described in
the standardised guide for the design of survivable networks
in [32], or in [33] for the case of optical networks. A redundant
network design implies the use of backup resources and high
costs. A different solution is the one presented in [34], which
investigates new methods for lessening the impact of large-
scale failures (uncorrelated multiple failures) in terms of the
number of affected connections, by deploying immunization
strategies (i.e., by fortifying a certain set of links). This is
achieved by identifying the links to which extra network
protection can be applied so that the impact of such failure
events, in terms of the number of connections affected, is
minimized. This is done by introducing two heuristic-based
link prioritization strategies for improving network resilience:
one is built upon the concept of betweenness centrality, while
the other one adopts the measure that the authors named as the
observed link criticality. Zhang et al. [35] considered shielding
critical links (e.g. strengthening cables), under general and
geographical failure models. A MILP formulation to minimize
shielding cost to ensure the connectivity of a given source-
destination pair, was developed, then extended to guarantee
network connectivity. Simulated annealing was also used to
solve larger problems. Another different approach for network
connectivity is to equip the network and its nodes with some
methods to rearrange the network resources and services on
a partially damaged network (self-organizing network) [36],
so as to mitigate the effects of disasters. A similar solution is
presented in [37], which focuses on the ability of devices –
called Stem Nodes (SN) – to reconfigure or install new compo-
nents to be able to cover multiple network roles (e.g., gateway
or relay). This work proposes distributed algorithms, based
on swarm intelligence principles, through which each SN can
autonomously select its role, so that end-to-end performance
is maximized while the lifetime of the spontaneous emergency
network (so called STEM-NET) is prolonged. Last, Software-
Defined Networking and Network Functions Virtualisation are
useful enabling technologies to reconfigure logical networks
or how they are mapped to the physical network [38], [39].
When it comes to protect a network infrastructure against
extensive disruptions as those arising during a disaster, ensur-
ing network connectivity might result in a very costly design of
the network. Therefore, an alternative proactive survivability
approach that is currently attracting a lot of attention and
still represents an open field of research is the one known as
content connectivity, i.e., ensuring the reachability of content
from any node in the network without necessarily guaranteeing
network connectivity. The main idea is that even if a network
gets disconnected into multiple separate components due to
failures, the replication of content can be planned in such
a way that at least one copy of each relevant piece of
content is still reachable in each disconnected component. The
concept of content connectivity was first introduced in [40],
where the authors developed an Integer Linear Program (ILP)
model that guarantees content connectivity against single-link
failures. Following the same methodology, the authors in [41]
formulated a more practical version of the Survivable Virtual
Network Mapping (SVNM) problem, where network connec-
tivity is guaranteed against any single failure, while content
connectivity is guaranteed against any double-link failures.
Finally, a generalization of the content connectivity concept,
referred to a k-content connectivity, has been proposed to
ensure that any node in the network can still reach the content
after k−1 link failures in [42], where a flexible and cost-saving
algorithm of the problem is also presented.
The second issue we have mentioned above is that of traffic
congestion happening after a disaster. The first solution to
this problem is the one described in [43], where the authors
propose a mechanism for off-loading traffic to lightly loaded
neighbours, thereby increasing both handover success rate and
leftover power. A User Equipment (UE) controlled and Base
Station assisted process is described to allow handover of
equipment calls to lighter loaded base stations in a disaster
scenario. The main contribution is claimed to be the ability
of UE to self-detect the onset of a natural disaster and to act
accordingly (by selecting a less loaded base station from the
several available). The natural disaster detection is contingent
on base stations being able to provide the UE information asso-
ciated with load and power or battery capacity, which should
show distinctive patterns at the onset of a natural disaster.
Each base station would in turn use its own knowledge on
distance to base station (estimated from signal attenuation) and
direction of movement to select the suitable base station to use
at each moment. Another solution is the one in [36], which
starts from the consideration that telecom networks usually
have some unused capacity to accommodate traffic fluctuations
and avoid capacity exhaustion. Such capacity can be exploited
to provide better protection against disasters by alleviating
the traffic deluge and to relieve the rescue operations after
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a disaster.
A vulnerability of a network may not be intrinsic to the
network itself; in fact, the correct behaviour of a network and
its survivability depend also on the correct functioning of the
power grid. If there is an energy outage due to a failure within
the power distribution infrastructure caused by the disaster, the
network may become unavailable or seriously compromised.
Such a problem can be treated by introducing redundant power
sources that the network may use in case of a disaster so
as to avoid any compromises to its correct behaviour. In the
design of a Never Die Network (NDN) presented in [44], self-
powered fixed wireless network stations, cognitive mobile sta-
tions and wireless balloon stations represent a set of solutions
to tolerate energy outage without affecting the network. Also
in [45], there is a discussion of a planning framework to reduce
telecommunication network power supply vulnerability during
natural (earthquakes, hurricanes, storms and blizzards for
example) and man-made disasters. Such a framework suggests
several different solutions to improve energy effectiveness
in case of disasters, such as coordinating portable generator
set deployment among different network operators, and by
installing permanent photovoltaic systems at sites where long
electric outages are likely.
A last proactive robustness technique is related to the
internal organization and deployment of a network, which
falls within the so-called disaster avoidance control, presented
in [46]. It mainly consists in relocating software objects from
a high-risk region to a low-risk region, as described in [46].
B. Post-disaster network recovery
Infrastructure failures as well as traffic overload arising in
post-disaster areas have to be dealt with in future communica-
tion systems as effectively as possible, in order to provide con-
nectivity among governmental and non-governmental emer-
gency management teams, first responders and victims, victims
and families, etc. Noting that the subject of communication
varies as time elapses after a disaster [47], i.e., disaster alarm,
evacuation programs and orders, safety confirmation, first aid
support, lifeline information, shelters and traffic information,
etc., there are two pillars in post-disaster service recovery: (i)
rapid emergency communication network deployment, most
usually on top of surviving network infrastructure to allow
critical service provisioning in the first period after the dis-
aster, and (ii) effective maintenance of disconnected network
infrastructure that will allow full service recovery – see Fig. 4.
This subsection summarizes the most recent and representative
efforts in this context. Further techniques and approaches may
be found in the references of the reviewed papers.
1) Rapid emergency communication network deployment:
Emergency communication networks must ideally fulfil a
set of requirements to provide and maintain sustainable
communications [7]: resilience, basic service set provision,
self-capabilities (such as self-organization, -optimization, -
healing), node mobility, inter-operability, and compatibility
with other heterogeneous undamaged network systems as well
as low SWaP (size, weight and power). Two major categories
Fig. 4. Post-disaster network/service recovery methods classification
of emergency networks can be identified that, in any case, may
need to set up and operate simultaneously over a disaster area.
The first one includes networks based on vehicular or trans-
portable network nodes, e.g., base stations (BS) and access
points (AP), while the second one is based on user mobile
devices with enough energy to set-up ad-hoc/mesh networks,
acting as relay or gateways towards surviving network nodes.
a) Emergency networks based on transportable nodes:
The relevant literature presents solutions with a wide range in
set-up complexity and capabilities offered. A complete wire-
less mesh network based on MDRU (movable and deployable
resource unit) nodes was developed and tested by Sakano et
al. [48]. MDRUs are network nodes (carried in a van) that
offer connectivity to the Internet using satellite, pre-installed
optical fibre cables or surviving wireless access gateways.
The van-type MDRU can get the power supply from three
types of sources, namely gasoline electric generator, lithium-
ion battery unit, and electrical power input from outside. In
general, it can operate for five days without an external power
supply. In addition, portable WiFi modules (battery powered
– replenished by a solar panel) spread around the van area
offer AP gateway services via fixed wireless access connection
with the MDRU. The MDRU can provide voice service using
an IP-PBX server to one hundred users (that use their real
phone number) simultaneously. Field experiments showed that
a distance of 700 m from the MDRU can be covered with
three APs. This can be remarkably extended with a relay-by-
smartphone system. The overall system seems strong, however
in addition to the necessity of moving the van and the WiFi
equipment to the disaster area, energy efficiency and MDRU
inter-operability need to be further investigated.
Among the easiest to deploy transportable emergency net-
works is the “EmergeNet” [49]. This is a rapidly deploy-
able, small-scale cellular network based on the well-tested
OpenBTS open-source platform that uses a software-defined
radio transceiver to enable GSM transmission/reception. With
an additional set of software tools, inbound and outbound
VoIP calling and messaging is enabled through Skype for end
users with or without Skype clients. Features for automatic
reconfiguration of the BSs to maximize the functionality in
the face of power, network and/or hardware failures are also
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provided. Due to the fact that each BS can serve up to
7 concurrent calls, an automatic SMS-based call queueing
system is proposed to provide fair access, while avoiding user
recalls. EmergeNet can be AC or DC power supplied (e.g. by
power grids, portable generators, vehicle batteries). A three-
cell battery bank can provide 4 days of autonomous operation
and solar panels can be used as well to offer 24/7/365 uptime
in most locations. EmergeNet, based on the experimental tests
provided, seems to be a promising solution. However load and
security issues have to be further investigated.
Cheng et al. [50] describe a similar (based on OpenBTS)
small-cell system offering basic GSM services. The cells, with
a predefined cell ID, support registration of rescue team mem-
bers and victims through SMS. Furthermore, a pre-installed
to the mobile phone Android APP automatically detects the
emergency network after an early warning message, provides
the position of the victim and supports the rescue process with
a predefined set of features and information transfer. This is
more complex than EmergeNet, however it may be promising
if extended testing is performed.
b) Emergency networks based on end-user devices: Net-
work node transportation may not be feasible in certain disas-
ter cases. Therefore, in order to provide fast and infrastructure-
free service recovery, a great number of techniques engaging
mobile user equipment to set-up ad-hoc/mesh networks up to a
surviving node have been presented. Among them, the above
mentioned STEM-NET [37], providing self-configurable SN
implementation, allows the set-up of an ad-hoc network on
top of existing end-user devices.
However, while STEM-NET requires a new software ar-
chitecture to be pre-installed in the mobile nodes, Minh et
al. [51], [52] propose a tree-based multi-hop WiFi network
that involves a downloadable (upon set-up of the network)
software-based implementation of network functions. Each
mobile acts as a virtual AP (VAP) to provide service to the
rest of the mobiles and as a STA (IEEE 802.11 wireless
station) communicating with the VAP to which it belongs.
A mechanism for auto-reconfiguration on link failures is also
proposed. The authors demonstrated experimentally that the
multi-hop network can be established in a few minutes over
an area of 600 m to 1 km. A drawback is that only the end
user can initiate a connection, due to private addressing of
mobile nodes, while load-balancing and security issues have
to be further considered. A similar (yet preliminary) approach
involving smartphone hotspots by WiFi tethering is proposed
by Ray et al. [53]. The authors provide algorithms for hotspot
selection based on the end-user’s direction of mobility and
the number of terminals that the hotspot allows, based on
calculation of its leftover energy. However no implementation
tests and results are given.
The extended use of mobile devices as relays in the above-
mentioned configurations has driven research efforts in optimal
relay placement in disaster scenarios. Herlich and Yamada [54]
simulated how disaster survivors can place mobile devices
as stationary relay chains to interconnect evacuation centres
and Internet gateways. Results show that among the strategies
considered, the most promising are: (i) link every evacuation
centre to the closest gateway with a relay chain (Direct
strategy), and (ii) link each evacuation centre to the 3 closest
evacuation centres or gateways with relay chains (Neighbour
3 strategy). In the same context, Kro´l et al. [55] formulated a
modified k-connectivity algorithm (k paths connecting each
disconnected evacuation centre with a connected one) and
simulated the proposed algorithm over a realistic disaster
scenario. Both approaches are interesting, but further analyses
are required.
Finally, the potential of IoT-enabled devices to enhance
network resilience in face of disaster has been introduced
by Petersen et al. [56]. The authors claim that IoT devices
may be used as relays based on their inherent ability to
leverage the spontaneous wireless networking paradigm, their
battery-powered operation capability, and the ability of sen-
sors to monitor various environmental parameters that can
be exploited to provide real-time data around disaster areas.
Nevertheless, major challenges have to be met towards this
end, i.e., limitations and inter-operability issues due to the
heterogeneous PHY and logical network connectivity of IoT
devices, traffic prioritization, social acceptance, as well as
security issues.
2) Effective network maintenance: Post-disaster situations
present high variability both in the infrastructure failures and
the communication needs as time evolves from minutes to days
to weeks after the occurrence of the first event. Therefore,
efficient planning of communication network maintenance is
vital in order to support the required services. Heegaard et
al. [57] propose a survivability quantification framework that
is used to model a multi-phase recovery procedure. In this
model, which is constructed by combining continuous time
Markov chain performance models, the system performance is
gradually changed throughout the multi-phase recovery, where
each phase models a specific recovery action or a set of parallel
actions. Each action may depend on the outcome of previous
actions. A numerical example, considering escalated levels of
recovery and deferred repair, is also presented.
A model to provide an optimal repair schedule over an
optical network after failure of multiple network elements
is discussed in [58]. The model is based on the travelling
repairman problem (TRP), and proper algorithms are examined
for scheduling repair tasks in order to achieve minimum
damage and low repair time. A Mixed Integer Linear Program
(MILP) solution is given, and heuristic algorithms, that is, a
greedy algorithm (GR), a dynamic programming (DP), and a
simulated annealing (SA) one, are proposed for solving the
problem. Simulation results over some illustrative examples
show that the heuristic solutions only deviate slightly from
the optimal solution and, due to their low complexity, can be
used for larger-scale problems.
Random failures and recoveries of network elements as time
evolves during post-disaster situations mandate scheduling
and rescheduling of user needs and surviving infrastructure
that serves them. Algorithms like the robust fault-tolerant
version of the uncapacitated facility location problem (RFTFL)
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[59] can be used in assigning user demands to surviving
datacentres, so that latency is minimized in case of multiple
failures.
IV. DISASTER-RESILIENT ROUTING ALGORITHMS
In this section, we review several techniques that have
been proposed since 2012 to route and protect traffic against
network failures. For a survey of work before 2012 we refer
the reader to [6]. We first consider tunable survivability against
single failures. Then we consider protection schemes for two
instantaneous failures or several failures all belonging to the
same risk group. We proceed by considering disaster-aware
routing, which demands considering the geo-information on
the network as well as temporal characteristics. We conclude
this section by discussing how to possibly route traffic when
a disaster has manifested.
A. Tunable survivability against single link failure
Yallouz and Orda [60] argue that providing full protection
against single link failures by establishing link-disjoint paths,
uses excessive resources in practice. Thus, tunable survivabil-
ity is proposed, which provides a quantitative measure for
survivability and offers flexibility for the service provider to
select paths for the connections by allowing some common
links along the two paths. While a given level of survivability
has to be satisfied by the path-pair, some bottleneck (e.g.,
bandwidth) or additive (e.g., delay) metric is minimized in
the optimization problem. Previous works already addressed
bottleneck QoS metrics (defined by the weakest component in
the path), thus, this paper considers the important and much
more complex class of additive metrics, where the QoS is the
result of the sum of link metrics along the paths. The most
important observation in the paper is that given a connection
that, consists of two paths per source-destination pair under
the single-link-failure model, only a failure on a link that is
common to both paths can disrupt the connection. There are
two ways of considering the weight of such common links
in the optimization problem. Namely, when in the weight of
the survivable path-pair, the weight of the common link is
counted once (CO) or twice (CT). One of the main findings
of the paper is that if the CT problem is considered, the links
that may affect the survivability of the optimal solution are
restricted to a very small subset of the network links. An
algorithm is proposed to identify those links efficiently. Note
that, as only this small set of links has to be considered as
common links, the computational complexity of the proposed
algorithms can be significantly reduced. However, both CO
and CT versions of the problem are shown to be NP-hard.
Fortunately, through a graph transformation that reduces the
problems under investigation to the restricted shortest path
(RSP) problem, the existing efficient fully polynomial approx-
imation schemes proposed for RSP can be applied.
Yallouz, Rottenstreich, and Orda [61] extend this line of
work by computing tunable survivable trees. Again, the single-
link failure model is considered and the research question is
how to build a set of k spanning trees, such that the probability
that at least one of the spanning trees in the connection is
operational and/or the routing bandwidth is maximized. All
links are considered to have the same failure probability, else
the problem becomes NP-hard. The authors have established
a novel polynomial-time algorithm for providing an optimal
set of (any) k spanning trees that maximizes its survivability
level while ensuring a guaranteed bandwidth. Additionally,
they have provided tight bounds on the number of spanning
trees that may be needed in order to achieve a maximum
level of survivability. Finally, through simulations, they have
showed that the maximum level of survivability can be well-
approximated by establishing just two spanning trees.
B. Resilience against multiple failures
Rohrer et al. [62] seek to close the gap between the fragility
of the current Internet and the notion of maximum flow
reliability. They focus on the ability of a topology to remain
connected if multiple simultaneous node and link failures
occur and devise a mechanism – path diversification – to
instantiate a unified interface that is as reliable as the under-
lying physical graph. Aiming to achieve a resilient multipath
mechanism, the authors define several path diversity metrics
that can be applied to both node pairs and complete networks.
They develop an algorithm for selecting the best subset of
available paths, in the sense that these paths are maximally
diverse and have minimal stretch. Through simulations, the
authors analyse the extent to which the proposed metrics
are correlated to both graph theoretic properties and network
survivability.
For the case where backup paths can be shared, Liu and
Tipper [63] address dual-link-failures protection within the
context of IP/MPLS or WDM networks. By using a spare
provision matrix method, the authors collect information for
each individual flow and thus are able to compute the shared
spare capacity for dual-link failures. In order to minimize
network redundancy, the authors present a non-linear integer
programming model. By partitioning this model into two
linear sub-models which are solved sequentially, the authors
obtain upper bounds on the required spare capacity. For
large networks, an iterative heuristic is proposed to solve
those sub-models. The authors consider several variations of
shared backup path protection, combining the extensions of
the 1+1 and 1:1 protection mechanisms for dual-link failures
with active or passive sharing, allowing for capacity sharing
schemes of different complexity.
Liu [64] subsequently addresses protection coordination
between existing single-link-failure protection schemes (inde-
pendently) implemented at each layer of two-layer networks
(e.g., IP/MPLS over OTN/ASON). Making use of existing
single-link-failure protection mechanisms at both layers, Liu
is able to compute working and backup paths on both layers
in a coordinated way by (1) capturing all dual-link failures on
the bottom layer; and (2) passing that information to the top
layer, where the aim is to minimize spare capacity. For those
networks that are not three-connected, partial disjoint paths
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can be used in an attempt to still guarantee the required level
of protection.
Bermond et al. [65] address the problem of finding diverse
paths between a pair of nodes when multiple correlated link
failures are modelled as Shared Risk Link Groups (SRLG).
This problem is NP-complete for general SRLGs. In this paper,
the special case is considered where all the links in an arbitrary
SRLG share a common endpoint: the “star property.” The
authors investigate the problem of finding k-SRLG-disjoint
source-destination paths, and also the problem of finding the
maximum number of SRLG-disjoint paths between two nodes.
Also polynomial-time algorithms are proposed for graphs
satisfying some special properties. A multi-coloured graph is
introduced, where each SRLG is represented as a different
colour. Thus, a colour belongs to multiple edges (having a
common node) and an edge can have multiple colours. The
authors prove that the k-diverse coloured source-destination
path problem (k-DCP) is NP-complete. Polynomial cases are
presented for the k-DCP problem: (1) When the number of
colours (i.e., SRLGs) is bounded by a constant, a polynomial
algorithm exists for every topology, (2) If the nodal degree
is bounded, a polynomial-time algorithm exists for k-DCP
when the maximum degree is at most three, and for 2-DCP
even when it is four, (3) In Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG),
where a polynomial algorithm is only possible for constant k
values. Finally, the problem of finding the maximum number
of colour disjoint paths (MDCP) is considered. It is shown
that the MDCP problem is NP-complete in the strong sense,
and it is hard to approximate within a constant factor.
C. Spatio-temporal disaster-aware routing
A large-scale disaster may affect an area of a certain shape,
e.g., a circle representing the radius of an EMP attack. A
problem of interest is therefore finding disjoint paths that
cannot be separated by the failure of an area of a predefined
size and shape.
Dikbiyik et al. [66] deal with the static network planning
problem of survivable optical backbone networks. Input to the
network planning problem are the topology graph, the number
of wavelengths, the set of connections, and the set of possible
disaster failures. First, a probabilistic risk model is developed
to analyse the loss/penalty, given the set of possible disasters.
It considers the physical locations of network equipment
(e.g., physical routes of fibre links), their distances from
the disaster’s epicentre, and the type of disaster. Second, a
proactive traffic engineering solution for disaster protection
is given, where valuable connections are routed on no-(or
low-) risk regions. Third, the authors investigate a reactive
traffic engineering solution, where disrupted connections are
re-provisioned. The problem is formulated as an Integer Linear
Program (ILP). Also, heuristics are developed to deal with
large networks.
Trajanovski et al. [16] address the problem of finding two
region-disjoint paths that (with the exception of the regions
around the source and destination) cannot both be cut by
a failure of given diameter. In this case, the shape of the
failing region is not important, only its diameter is (as it
could be rotated in any direction). The problem of finding
region-disjoint paths is shown to be NP-hard, after which a
heuristic algorithm is proposed and compared via simulations
on realistic topologies to an exact ILP formulation and a naı¨ve
approach.
Izadoost et al. [67] focus on the problem of large-scale
failures in backbone networks with a dynamic probabilistic
model that not only considers the time-varying dynamics of
regional disasters, but also takes into account the probabilistic
nature of failures resulting from such events. The authors
propose a novel approach in probabilistic large-scale failure
scenarios, which aims to increase the network survivability
level and mitigate the effects of a disaster (connections dis-
ruption). The proposed survivability scheme is a preventive
protection method that allows the network control plane to
receive notifications about the current impact range of a
disaster, to estimate the probability of failure for each path
in the study, and to reroute the traffic from the endangered
routes to the more reliable paths prior to the failure.
Iqbal and Kuipers [19] consider a similar spatio-temporal
rerouting problem, for which they provide polynomial-time
algorithms.
D. Post-disaster routing
As already mentioned in paragraph III-B1a, Ngo et al. [68]
consider a post-disaster communication network that is based
on MDRUs. To deal with the critical demand of ICT services,
spectrum-efficient methods should be considered in MDRU-
based networks. Furthermore, to solve the power supply prob-
lem, renewable energy functions should be used together with
energy-efficient methods. In this context, the paper addresses
the issue of combined optimization of both spectrum and
energy efficiency in order to provide better system perfor-
mance in a post-disaster situation. The authors introduce a new
metric, namely, the spectrum-energy efficiency, to measure
how many transmissions can be carried out with a limited
frequency band and limited energy resources. They propose
a scheme that is composed of two phases, namely, topology
formation and transmission division. The topology formation
phase creates a topology by using the top k spectrum-efficient
disjoint paths from each sender. The gateways that are not
in the resulting topology are not used. In the transmission
division phase, the traffic is split from each gateway to the
neighbours in the topology by using a max-flow-with-vertex-
capacities algorithm. The authors prove that a value of k exists
that leads to the maximum spectrum-energy efficiency of the
MDRU-based network and that the proposed algorithm has
polynomial complexity with respect to k.
Also the use of decentralized mobile wireless networks,
such as delay and disruption tolerant networks (DTNs) that
do not require end-to-end connectivity between source and
destination, is a possible way to deal with disasters. However,
DTN routing protocols were not designed for that purpose,
and hence may suffer from performance degradation. DTN
protocols, like the Spray and wait flooding based routing
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protocol that attempts to gain the delivery ratio benefits of
replication-based routing as well as the low resource utilization
benefits of forwarding-based routing, may have to be adapted.
Huda et al. [69] start by pointing out the limitations of DTN
routing algorithms in areas affected by large-scale disasters:
either they result in excessive energy consumption or they
perform poorly because their under-lying assumptions are no
longer valid. To significantly reduce the call surge in a disaster-
stricken area, the authors propose a Location-aware Message
Delivery (LMD) approach to provide short message commu-
nications among family members, friends, and co-workers.
The objectives of this system are to save power at the nodes
(which are battery powered) and to ensure a high message
delivery ratio. To achieve these objectives, LMD requires that
communication devices must have location awareness and that
the exchange of statistical location information and respective
time of day must take place automatically among authorized
parties (family members, friends, etc.). LMD uses a single
copy of the message, makes locally optimal decisions and
ensures an inherently loop-free forwarding rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent natural disasters have highlighted the relevance
of communication systems for effective disaster mitigation.
Emergency networks must be able to operate in challenging
scenarios and allow to transmit the information necessary to
deploy and coordinate relief operations. Moreover, the network
architecture should be designed so that services for costumers
not in the affected areas suffer minimal impact.
In this work, we gave an overview on the state of the art
in large scale regional failures. Approaches for network vul-
nerability assessment, strategies for enhancing the robustness
of an existing network, and solutions for achieving resilient
routing, including disaster-aware routing were presented.
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